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SPEAKING OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE BALLOT INITIATIVE LAWS 
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
Trane J. Robinson* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Citizen-led ballot initiatives provide voters an avenue to promulgate 
new laws or constitutional amendments via direct democracy. With 
ballot initiatives, voters may bypass their state legislature and express 
their collective will instead through popular vote––in contrast to our 
traditional system of representative democracy, where constituents elect 
lawmakers. Such ballot initiative mechanisms are constitutionally 
permissive, though not required, but if provided, they must comply with 
the Constitution. Roughly half of States offer their voters an initiative 
process.1 And those States must regulate the mechanics by which 
proposed initiatives reach the ballot, as they have an interest in 
preserving “some sort of order, rather than chaos” in their democratic 
processes.2 Such laws may risk running headlong into the First 
Amendment’s implicit guarantee of free expression.3 State laws that 
regulate the ballot initiative process have triggered First Amendment 
challenges by popular initiative proponents whose cause did not see the 
ballot come election day. 
Ahead of the 2020 election, the Supreme Court stayed a lower court 
injunction that adjusted Idaho’s signature-gathering requirement for 
ballot initiatives.4 Chief Justice Roberts concurred in the grant of stay 
and wrote separately to describe “the transformative and intrusive 
nature” of the judicial intervention.5 He noted, “the Circuits diverge in 
 
  * Associate Member, 2019-20, University of Cincinnati Law Review. Thank you to Donald 
P. Klekamp Professor of Law Michael Solimine for the guidance and wisdom he shared to improve this 
Comment. Thank you to Benjamin M. Flowers for inspiring this topic. 
 1. Initiative Process 101, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, https://perma.cc/AJ8X-SUAV; 
Initiative and Referendum States, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, https://perma.cc/EU7J-BLYH. See 
Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy: A Reappraisal, 104 KY. L.J. 671, 675 n.24 
(2016). 
 2. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 187 (1999) (quoting Storer v. 
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).  
 3. The First Amendment provides, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Incorporation Doctrine made that 
proscription apply to state legislatures the same as Congress. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 
(1925). 
 4. Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616 (2020). 
 5. Id. at 2618. Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented from the Court’s grant 
of stay, urging that it “likely dooms to mootness” the initiative proponents’ claims in premature fashion. 
Id. at 2619 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the grant of stay). 
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fundamental respects when presented with challenges to” State 
regulations of their ballot initiative processes (“gatekeeping laws”6), and 
accordingly “have applied their conflicting frameworks to reach 
predictably contrary conclusions . . . .”7 Some jurisdictions “require 
scrutiny of interests,” the Chief Justice explained, while others, “by 
contrast, have held that regulations that may make the initiative process 
more challenging do not implicate the First Amendment so long as the 
State does not restrict political discussion or petition circulation.”8 
Without purporting to resolve the issue, Chief Justice Roberts added, 
“reasonable, nondiscretionary restrictions are almost certainly justified 
by the important regulatory interests” “States retain . . . ‘to protect the 
integrity and reliability of the initiative process.’”9 
This Comment examines the interplay between State ballot initiative 
laws and the First Amendment through the circuit conflict identified in 
Little v. Reclaim Idaho.10 Part II first identifies relevant Supreme Court 
precedents that guide the courts of appeal. Next, it surveys where the 
circuits that have weighed in stand––whether they apply no First 
Amendment scrutiny, rational-basis review, or heightened scrutiny. Part 
III argues that First Amendment challenges to state gatekeeping laws 
should be subject to rational-basis review at most when the burden on 
speech is neither direct nor severe. The structure of the Constitution 
dictates that the federal judiciary is ill-suited to weigh the sufficiency of 
a State’s election regulation interest. This Comment concludes by 
presenting a coherent rule derived from precedent that would resolve the 
circuit conflict. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A majority of the United States Courts of Appeals have addressed the 
relationship between the First Amendment and ballot initiative 
frameworks. The District of Columbia, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits apply either no First Amendment scrutiny or the lax 
rational-basis review to State gatekeeping laws.11 The First, Sixth, and 
Ninth Circuits, meanwhile, apply some form of heightened scrutiny.12 In 
Schmitt v. LaRose, Judge Bush observed, “[t]he Supreme Court has not 
 
 6. See Schmitt v. LaRose, 933 F.3d 628, 643 n.1 (6th Cir. 2019) (Bush, J., concurring) (“I 
sometimes refer to [Ohio's legislative authority] statutes as the ‘gatekeeper’ provisions.”). 
 7. Little, 140 S. Ct. at 2616-17 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the grant of stay). 
 8. Id. at 2616. 
 9. Id. at 2616-17 (quoting Buckley, 525 U.S. at 191). 
 10. 140 S. Ct. 2616 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the grant of stay). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See id. 
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addressed the precise scope of the First Amendment interests, if any, 
that are implicated by laws that regulate only the mechanics of an 
initiative process,” but the Court has provided guidance.13  
A. Supreme Court Guidance 
In the landmark decision United States v. O’Brien,14 The government 
prosecuted Paul O’Brien after he burned his Selective Service 
registration certificate in a public display on the steps of a Boston 
Courthouse.15 O’Brien violated the Universal Military Training and 
Service Act, which proscribed knowingly destroying or mutilating one’s 
registration certificate.16 O’Brien asserted that the Act unconstitutionally 
suppressed his freedom of speech.17 
The Court explained that a “sufficiently important governmental 
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental 
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”18 Here, the law’s ban on 
burning draft cards incidentally burdened O’Brien’s anti-draft 
expression. The Supreme Court held a regulation that incidentally 
restricts speech is constitutional if: “it is within the constitutional power 
of the Government,” “it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest,” “the governmental interest is unrelated to the 
suppression of free expression,” and “the incidental restriction on 
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.”19 That four-part test imparts intermediate 
scrutiny by weighing free expression interests against governmental 
interests in upholding laws that restrain conduct but incidentally restrict 
speech.20 
Derived from First Amendment challenges related to ballot access, 
the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework “consider[s] the character 
and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate,” 
against the State’s “precise interests put forward . . . as justifications for 
the burden imposed by its rule.”21 In three steps, courts: evaluate the 
 
 13. 933 F.3d at 644 (Bush, J., concurring). 
 14. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 15. Id. at 369. 
 16. Id. at 370. 
 17. See id. at 376. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 377. 
 20. Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 279 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[W]e apply the intermediate 
scrutiny standard set out in O'Brien.”). 
 21. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). 
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severity of the restriction imposed,22 “evaluate the state’s interests in and 
justifications for the regulation,23 and last, determine the constitutional 
legitimacy of the restrictions in light of the strength of the stated 
interests.24 This test, like O’Brien, effectively subjects the challenged 
State election regulation to intermediate scrutiny. 
Anderson v. Celebrezze involved a free association challenge to 
Ohio’s statutorily imposed early filing deadline applied against 
independent candidates who wished to appear on the ballot.25 The law 
burdened individuals’ voting and associational rights by limiting 
independent candidates in a different manner than major-party 
candidates.26 At the same time, the Court recognized that “State[s’] 
important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify 
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”27 Here, the Court 
determined the early deadline provision against independent candidates 
imposed a burden on voters’ associational rights that was sufficiently 
severe to violate the First Amendment.28 
In Anderson’s lineage, Burdick v. Takushi reviewed Hawaii’s 
prohibition on write-in voting under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.29 Hawaii justified “its ban on write-in voting” by 
asserting interests “in avoiding the possibility of unrestrained 
factionalism at the general election,” and “winnowing out candidates.”30 
Unlike Ohio’s early filing provision in Anderson, the Court upheld 
Hawaii’s write-in provision.  Nevertheless, Anderson and Burdick are 
together the genesis of an interest-balancing test courts have applied to 
State ballot access provisions. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Meyer v. Grant established that 
strict scrutiny applies to a ballot initiative regulations targeting speech, 
not election mechanics; it is a leading case on First Amendment 
challenges to State ballot initiative laws.31 In Colorado, proponents of a 
new state law or constitutional amendment can place their initiative on 
the general election ballot only if they produce an initiative petition with 
the requisite number of qualified signatures.32 But Colorado 
 
 22. Schmitt v. LaRose, 933 F.3d 628, 639 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area 
New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997)). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. 460 U.S. at 783. 
 26. Id. at 787. 
 27. Id. at 788. 
 28. Id. at 806. 
 29. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 30. Id. at 439 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31. 486 U.S. 414 (1988). 
 32. Id. at 415-16. 
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criminalized the payment of individuals who circulate ballot initiative 
petitions in an effort to obtain signatures.33 
Grant argued that the restriction on compensation for circulation 
unconstitutionally limited political expression.34 The Supreme Court 
agreed; the circulation of an initiative petition necessarily involved 
“core political speech.”35 As such, the regulation limited the number of 
circulators willing to spread the message and, as a consequence, the size 
of the audience able to receive the political message. The law also made 
proponents less likely to amass the requisite number of signatures to 
earn ballot access.36 Critically, the criminalization of paying petition 
circulators burdened initiative proponents’ ability to communicate the 
message in order to obtain signatures. Meanwhile, the law did not 
advance the State’s interest in protecting the integrity of the ballot 
initiative process, which Colorado’s minimum signature requirement 
still protected.37 
Restrictions upon ballot initiative advocacy, the Court explained, are 
“wholly at odds with the guarantees of the First Amendment.”38 The 
Colorado statute imposed a severe burden on political speech, triggering 
strict scrutiny, which the statute could not withstand.39 
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation involved another 
challenge to three of Colorado’s ballot initiative process regulations; the 
Supreme Court reviewed statutes that (1) required initiative petition 
circulators to be registered voters, (2) required those circulators to wear 
identification badges, and (3) required paid circulators to report their 
name and address.40 Guided by Meyer, the Court held all three 
restrictions “significantly inhibit communication with voters about 
proposed political change, and are not warranted by the state 
interests.”41 The laws hindered circulators’ ability to spread initiative 
petitions, and with that, the ideas the petition espoused. The second and 
third statutes obstructed one’s First Amendment right to advocate 
anonymously––a right exercised by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, who 
wrote The Federalist Papers under the pseudonym “Publius.”42 Each of 
the three requirements imposed severe burdens on speech, and none 
 
 33. See id. at 417 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-110 (1980)). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 422. 
 36. Id. at 423. 
 37. Id. at 426. 
 38. Id. at 428 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 50 (1976)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. 525 U.S. 182, 186 (1999). 
 41. Id. at 192. 
 42. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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promoted State interests that could surmount strict scrutiny.43 
Neither Meyer nor Buckley is on all fours with the issue dividing the 
courts of appeal that this Comment addresses. Those cases contemplate 
laws that present an impediment to ballot initiative advocacy, not the 
process by which initiatives reach the ballot.44 Meyer and Buckley 
plainly establish, laws that severely burden speech must be narrowly 
tailored to a compelling government interest. But, when “a challenged 
election law regulates ‘the mechanics of the electoral process,’ not 
speech,” the First Amendment is implicated only incidentally, at most.45 
Yet, the Supreme Court has resisted bright line rules in this area: “No 
litmus-paper test will separate valid ballot-access provisions from 
invalid interactive speech restrictions.”46 
The next Section surveys circuit-level cases that test the 
constitutionality of State ballot initiative frameworks, beginning with 
the jurisdictions that have applied heightened scrutiny. 
B. The Heightened Scrutiny Circuits 
To apply intermediate scrutiny in this context, courts balance the 
State’s interest in enforcing the challenged law against the incidental 
burdens imposed on speech.  Laws that impose more direct or severe 
burdens on First Amendment rights, by contrast, are subject to more 
exacting review, and are distinguishable from challenged laws in the 
cases that follow.47 
1. The First Circuit 
In Wirzburger v. Galvin, two citizens of Massachusetts sought to 
amend their State Constitution through its popular ballot-initiative 
mechanism.48 Their cause was to update Massachusetts’s “Anti-Aid 
Amendment,” which “prohibits public financial support for private . . . 
schools.”49 The initiative would ensure the State’s ability to provide 
benefits to private schools, “regardless of the schools’ religious 
affiliation.”50 Two clauses in the Massachusetts Constitution impeded 
 
 43. See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 44. See Schmitt v. LaRose, 933 F.3d 628, 644 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 45. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 207-08 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995)). 
 46. Id. at 192 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 47. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). 
 48. Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271,274 (1st Cir. 2005). See MASS. CONST. art. 48 (allowing 
constitutional amendment by popular initiative). 
 49. Wirzburger, 412 F.3d at 274.  
 50. Id. 
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the initiative from reaching the ballot: the first provision expressly 
prohibited amendment by popular initiative to the Anti-Aid 
Amendment; the other provision prevented religiously affiliated ballot 
initiatives.51 The initiative-seeking citizens brought First Amendment 
challenges to both constitutional provisions that independently thwarted 
ballot access. 
The court reasoned that both constitutional provisions have an 
adverse effect on communicative activity, yet each is “aimed at non-
communicative impact.”52 Laws, such as these, that target the State 
initiative procedure have only a secondary impact on speech, so the 
court reasoned.53 The ratifying public of the Massachusetts Constitution 
adopted two amendments that independently disqualified the 
proponents’ initiative from the popular ballot initiative process.54 Those 
amendments set boundaries of scope by excluding certain categories 
citizen-created laws; nevertheless the amendments incidentally negated 
speech. 
The litigation narrowed on the applicable tier of scrutiny for First 
Amendment review. The court distinguished this case from Meyer v. 
Grant: where Meyer regulated “the means that initiative proponents 
could use to reach their audience of potential petition signers,” the 
Massachusetts provisions prevented “the act of generating laws . . . 
about certain subjects by initiative.”55  Thus, strict scrutiny was 
inapplicable. The court landed on intermediate scrutiny because, in its 
view, the Massachusetts ballot initiative process facilitated political 
expression, yet the laws regulate procedure “such that any effect on 
speech is purely incidental.”56 The court applied O’Brien’s four-part 
analysis––intermediate scrutiny––because “expression is affected by the 
regulations of the state initiative process,” but only as an unintended 
consequence.57 
 The court recognized compelling State interests in preventing the 
establishment of religion and “restricting the means by which these 
fundamental rights can be changed,” and added the laws under review 
only minimally restricted speech.58 Thus, the court held, 
“Massachusetts’ exclusions to its initiative process . . . survive 
 
 51. Id. at 274-75. 
 52. Id. at 275 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2 at 790 
(2d ed. 1988)). 
 53. Id. at 276-77. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 277 (emphasis in original). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 279. 
 58. Id. 
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intermediate scrutiny.”59 
 2. The Ninth Circuit 
The Nevada Constitution permits its citizens to enact legislation 
through a ballot initiative process, conditioned on initiative proponents 
gathering sufficient signatures from each State congressional district.60 
That requirement—the “All Districts Rule”—ensures adequate 
geographic distribution of initiative supporters.61 In Nevada, citizens’ 
interests in Las Vegas could vary substantially from those of citizens 
who inhabit the more rural areas of the State. 
The plaintiffs in Angle v. Miller argued Nevada’s All Districts Rule 
facially violated the First Amendment.62 The court, guided by Meyer v. 
Grant, said the All Districts Rule does not impose a direct burden on 
speech.63 Nevada asserted its interest in “making sure that an initiative 
has sufficient grass roots support to be placed on the ballot.”64 The court 
granted Nevada “leeway” to regulate its ballot initiative processes 
provided that restrictions of political speech are not excessive.65 
The court observed that the First Amendment does not guarantee 
ballot access to an initiative, but gatekeeping laws that “significantly 
inhibit the ability of initiative proponents to place initiatives on the 
ballot” severely burden statewide speech, even if as an incidental 
consequence.66 Thus, the court weighed the severity of the burden on 
ballot access imposed by the All District Rule against the Nevada’s 
election regulation interests—interest balancing of this kind is the 
hallmark of intermediate scrutiny. The court determined Nevada’s 
interests in regulating its elections and fostering statewide grassroots 
support for a ballot initiative justified the First Amendment burden.67 
3. The Sixth Circuit 
The Sixth Circuit has historically applied rational-basis review to 
First Amendment challenges of State ballot initiative regulations, but 
switched to the Anderson-Burdick framework.68 Recent cases have 
 
 59. Id. at 276. 
 60. Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012). See NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2. 
 61. Angle, 673 F.3d at 1126.  
 62. Id. at 1127. 
 63. Id. at 1133. 
 64. Id. at 1135 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1988).). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1133. 
 67. Id. at 1135. 
 68. See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1f (reserving the initiative power to “the people of each 
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raised doubt as to the propriety of that course, a course that began with 
Obama for America v. Husted.69 Initially, in Taxpayers United for 
Assessment Cuts v. Austin, the Sixth Circuit decided a freedom-of-
association challenge to a Michigan statute that conditioned ballot 
access on a requisite minimum number of initiative petition signatures.70 
Even with the freedom of expression element, the Sixth Circuit applied 
rational-basis review, not the Anderson-Burdick balancing because the 
law was content-neutral and non-discriminatory.71 Here, unlike in Meyer 
v. Grant, Michigan’s minimum signature law imposed no restriction on 
advocacy.72 That distinction was dispositive; the Sixth Circuit found that 
Michigan’s interest in requiring sufficient support before granting ballot 
access outweighed the secondary effects on speech.73 
 Even though Obama for America was not about ballot initiatives, but 
early in-person voting,74 it is relevant here for importing the Anderson-
Burdick balancing framework to First Amendment challenges to voting 
restrictions in the Sixth Circuit.75 
 Schmitt v. LaRose, by contrast, squarely presented a First Amendment 
challenge to “the laws [that] regulate the process by which initiative 
legislation is put before the electorate.”76 The plaintiffs argued that 
Ohio’s gatekeeping laws created an unconstitutional prior restraint on 
ballot initiative proposals, and therefore “unduly hamper[] their right to 
political expression.”77 After dispelling the notion that the laws imposed 
a prior restraint on speech, the majority resorted to the Anderson-
Burdick balancing framework to parse the constitutionality of Ohio’s 
ballot initiative process. The majority did not explain why Ohio’s laws 
warranted heightened scrutiny; the court simply reasoned: “we generally 
evaluate First Amendment challenges to state election regulations under 
the three-step Anderson-Burdick framework.”78 The court determined 
that the ballot-initiative process did not impose a severe restriction on 
speech, only “at most, a second-order effect on protected speech.”79 The 
 
municipality”). 
 69. 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 70. Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 293 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 71. Id. at 297. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 425. 
 75. Id. at 430; See also Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396, 406 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Obama for 
America v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 430 (6th Cir. 2012)) (“The Anderson-Burdick test may apply to First 
Amendment claims as well as to Equal Protection claims”). 
 76. Schmitt v. LaRose, 933 F.3d 628, 638 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 639. 
 79. Id. at 638. 
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court further concluded that the State’s interest in preserving the 
integrity of the election process, among other interests, justified the 
minor restrictions.80 Therefore, the court concluded that Ohio’s 
gatekeeping laws comply with the First Amendment.81 
 Judge Bush concurred in part and in the judgment, but did not join the 
Court’s First Amendment analysis because he would have applied 
rational-basis review.82 State-enacted “rules of election mechanics that 
are content-neutral and do not discriminate against any particular point 
of view,” he explained, do not “run[] afoul of the First Amendment.”83 
The Ohio ballot initiative laws, Judge Bush continued, do not interfere 
with an individual’s First Amendment right “to advocate for a proposed 
initiative,” rather they regulate election mechanics.84 Those laws “ensure 
that certain eligibility requirements are met before an initiative is 
formally certified for the ballot and voted on by the people” in their 
sovereign capacity.85 He placed the issue raised in Schmitt outside the 
reach of Anderson-Burdick, which had been traditionally limited to 
“laws that burden candidates from appearing on the ballot86—not a 
general “First Amendment challenge to state election regulations.”87 In 
Judge Bush’s judgment, Ohio’s content-neutral, non-discriminatory 
gatekeeping laws are legitimate so long as the State can advance a 
rational basis.88 
The Sixth in Committee to Impose Term Limits on the Ohio Supreme 
Court v. Ohio Ballot Board applied Anderson-Burdick balancing to a 
content-neutral Ohio statute that regulates election mechanics.89 The 
plaintiff argued that an Ohio provision limiting an initiative petition to 
one proposal (“the single-subject rule”) violated the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. But the court upheld the rule because it was “minimally 
burdensome and nondiscriminatory,” and as such under Anderson-
Burdick, “are subject to a less-searching examination closer to rational 
basis.”90 
Subsequent cases have applied Anderson-Burdick balancing to 
election regulation challenges consistent with circuit precedent, but 
those cases have raised doubt as to the efficacy of using the framework 
 
 80. Id. at 640-42. 
 81. Id. at 642. 
 82. Id. at 642-43 (Bush, J., concurring in judgment). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 644. 
 87. Id. at 639. 
 88. Id. at 651. 
 89. 885 F.3d 443 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 90. Id. at 448 (quoting Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 627 (6th Cir. 2016)). 
10
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so broadly. Jail-confined Ohioans, for example, brought an Equal 
Protection as well as a First Amendment claim against Ohio’s absentee 
ballot request deadline, as applied to them.91 Here again, Obama for 
America constrained the court “to apply the Anderson-Burdick 
framework” to general election regulations.92 The court admitted it took 
“some legal gymnastics to quantify the ‘burden’” of the State law 
pursuant to Anderson-Burdick, but nevertheless upheld the law against 
equal protection and free association attacks.93 
The Sixth Circuit’s repeated resort to Anderson-Burdick balancing 
was manifest in Daunt v. Benson; on an issue of first impression, the 
court turned to that analysis because “[a]t bottom, the Anderson-Burdick 
framework is used for evaluating ‘state election laws,’”94 The plaintiffs  
in Daunt challenged certain requirements to sit on Michigan’s 
independent political districting commission as violating their First 
Amendment rights.95 Because Michigan advanced compelling interests 
that justified the only minor burdens on free speech and association, the 
law comfortably withstood Anderson-Burdick’s balancing framework.96 
 Judge Readler concurred in the judgment, but would not have applied 
the Anderson-Burdick framework.97 Judge Readler argued that Daunt 
“raise[d] a question regarding Michigan's chosen means of self-
governance, not its election mechanics,” and Anderson-Burdick applies 
only to the latter.98  The laws governing eligibility for Michigan’s 
independent redistricting commission—“an exercise in regulating the 
qualifications for public service”99—do not implicate limitations on 
ballot access or election mechanics, Judge Readler added.100 And he was 
reluctant to extend Anderson-Burdick beyond its intended domain 
because, particularly due to its sliding-scale balancing-test nature, 
“affords far too much discretion to judges.”101 Judge Readler would 
have resolved the challenge before him, and others like it, by resort to 
“historical understandings and foundational principles,” while deferring 
significantly to “a state’s strong interest in self-governance.”102 “[A] 
 
 91. Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 92. Id. at 783. 
 93. Id. at 783 n.4. 
 94. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 407 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441 (1992)) (alterations 
omitted). 
 95. Id. at 401. 
 96. Id. at 409. 
 97. Id. at 422 (Readler, J., concurring in judgment). 
 98. Id. at 423. 
 99. Id. at 424. 
 100. Id. at 423. 
 101. Id. at 424. 
 102. Id. at 426. 
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state’s prerogative in organizing its government, including its election 
system,” Judge Readler concluded his concurrence, “is a paramount 
aspect of state sovereignty, and a cornerstone of federalism.”103 
 Finally, returning to ballot initiative regulations, the Sixth Circuit 
issued an order upholding under the First Amendment Ohio’s ballot 
initiative requirements as applied in light of the onset of the novel 
COVID-19 pandemic.104 In particular, initiative proponents sought to 
enjoin Ohio’s ink-signature and witness requirements for certified 
obtaining ballot initiative support.105 Faithful to circuit precedent, the 
panel analyzed the First Amendment challenge of these 
“nondiscriminatory, content-neutral ballot initiative requirements under 
the Anderson-Burdick framework.”106 The plaintiffs’ basic theory: The 
pandemic ought to tip the interest-balancing scales in their favor, 
rendering the State interests for imposing ink-signature and witness 
requirements inadequate.107 Because Ohio’s stay-home order in response 
to the pandemic “specifically exempted conduct protected by the First 
Amendment,” the Court would not conclude the burdens imposed 
qualified as “severe.”108 Rather, the court decided by analogizing 
Schmitt, the burden was “intermediate.”109 Because Ohio advanced 
“compelling and well-established interests” in election administration, 
their provisions survived the challenge, even in the face of the 
coronavirus pandemic.110 
C. The Rational Basis Circuits 
Most circuits to address the issue review First Amendment challenges 
to State gatekeeping laws for a rational relation to a legitimate interest. 
In contrast to the limitation on ballot initiative advocacy reviewed in 
Meyer v. Grant, gatekeeping laws regulate election mechanics—the 
process not substance. Based upon that distinction, some courts have 
concluded that regulations on election mechanics do not implicate the 
First Amendment whatsoever.111   
 
 103. Id. at 431. 
 104. Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 806-07 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). 
 105. Id. at 806. 
 106. Id. at 808 (citing Schmitt v. LaRose, 933 F.3d 628, 639 (6th Cir. 2019)). 
 107. Id. at 808-09 (“We have regularly upheld ballot access regulations like those at issue. . . . But 
these are not normal times. So the question is whether the COVID-19 pandemic and Ohio’s stay-at-
home orders increased the burden that Ohio’s ballot-initiative regulations place on Plaintiffs’ First 
Amendment rights.”). 
 108. Id. at 809. 
 109. Id. at 811. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111, 1112 (8th Cir. 1997); Molinari v. 
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1. The Eighth Circuit 
Nebraskans may amend their Constitution through popular ballot 
initiative.112 Dobrovolny v. Moore resolved a First Amendment 
challenge to a ballot access provision that imposed a minimum signature 
requirement. Oddly, the requisite number of signatures could not be 
determined until after the petition’s due date.113 
That indeterminacy did not restrict the initiative proponent’s “ability 
to circulate petitions or otherwise engage in political speech.”114 The 
Nebraska regulation neither hindered political communication nor 
content, as distinguished from Meyer v. Grant.115 Regardless of whether 
Nebraska’s minimum signature provision rendered ballot access harder 
to achieve, the claim was not colorable under the First Amendment.116  
2. The District of Columbia Circuit 
The D.C. Home Rule Act established a District of Columbia Council 
and gave it legislative authority within the District.117 In 1978, the 
Council adopted a popular ballot initiative procedure subject to the same 
limitations that Congress imposed on the Council when Congress 
delegated its lawmaking authority.118 The Marijuana Policy Project 
submitted a ballot initiative proposal that would allow doctors to 
prescribe medical marijuana to certain patients, but the D.C. Board of 
Elections and Ethics, in its regulatory capacity over the D.C. ballot 
initiative process, refused to certify the proposal as ballot eligible.119 A 
congressional amendment removed laws that would reduce the penalty 
associated with use of controlled substances from the scope of the 
delegated authority created by the D.C. Home Rule Act.120 Since the 
proposal exceeded the D.C. Council’s authority, it also exceeded the 
 
Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 596 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 112. Dobrovolny, 126 F.3d at 1112; See NEB. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2, 4. 
 113. Dobrovolny, 126 F.3d at 1112. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 1113. 
 116. Id. at 1112 (“While the Nebraska provision may have made it difficult for appellants to plan 
their initiative campaign and efficiently allocate their resources, the difficulty of the process alone is 
insufficient to implicate the First Amendment.”). 
 117. Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 F.3d 82, 83 (D.C. Cir. 2002); See D.C. CODE 
MUN. REGS. tit. 1 § 201.01  (LexisNexis 2020). 
 118. Marijuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 83. Broadly, the ballot initiative process adopted by 
the D.C. Council is akin to state municipal ballot initiative processes, like, for example, Ohio’s. See 
supra, note 3; See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.11(K) (LexisNexis 2020). 
 119. Marijuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 84. 
 120. Id. The “Barr Amendment” provides: “None of the funds contained in this Act may be used 
to enact or carry out any law, rule, or regulation to legalize or otherwise reduce penalties associated with 
the possession, use, or distribution of any . . . or any tetrahydrocannabinols derivative.” Id. 
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bounds of the ballot initiative process that the Council created.121 In 
Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, the proponents argued that 
the amendment transgressed the First Amendment.122 
The court noted that the amendment merely retains for Congress the 
legislative authority to reduce the penalty associated with using 
marijuana.123 Congress chose not to delegate that authority to the D.C. 
Council; that decision does not violate—or perhaps even implicate—the 
First Amendment.124 While limits on legislative advocacy raise First 
Amendment concerns, limits on legislative authority do not because 
citizens have no right to legislate.125 The amendment did not restrict 
proponents of marijuana-related legislation from advocating their view, 
it “merely removes a subject from [the ballot initiative] process 
altogether.”126 Without weighing countervailing interests, the court held 
the amendment “restrict[ed] no First Amendment right.”127 
3. The Tenth Circuit 
Utah is another State that enables citizen-led legislative initiatives.128 
A simple majority typically suffices, but initiatives related to wildlife 
management require a supermajority’s approval for popular democracy 
to create new law.129 In Initiative & Referendum Institution v. Walker, 
the en banc Tenth Circuit upheld Utah’s supermajority constitutional 
provision against a First Amendment challenge because the provision 
“d[id] not implicate the freedom of speech.”130 
The court distinguished Meyer v. Grant, finding that it does not 
control First Amendment challenges against state “laws that determine 
the process by which legislation is enacted.”131 Utah’s supermajority 
provision sets a procedure for proposals related to wildlife management 
to become law. And the supermajority provision cannot transgress the 
First Amendment by merely making the initiatives it reaches less likely 
to succeed, as supermajority requirements abound in state and federal 
constitutional law.132  
 
 121. Id. at 85. 
 122. Id. at 84. 
 123. Id. at 84-85. 
 124. Id. at 86. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 87. 
 127. Id. 
 128. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1(2)(a)(i)(A). 
 129. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1(2)(a)(ii). 
 130. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1085 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 131. Id. at 1100. 
 132. Id. Notable supermajority provisions in the Constitution are: the impeachment clause, U.S. 
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The court rejected the First Circuit’s application of the O’Brien 
test.133 The Tenth Circuit found O’Brien’s intermediate scrutiny inapt 
because the supermajority provision did not restrict expressive conduct 
comparable to burning a draft card.134 Rather, the supermajority 
requirement imposed a “structural principle of government” that made it 
a taller task to realize certain outcomes––passing popular initiatives 
related to wildlife management.135 Echoing other courts, the Tenth 
Circuit noted laws that reduce the impact of speech are markedly 
distinct from laws that burden the ability to speak.136 The supermajority 
provision is the former in kind, while the First Amendment prohibits 
only the latter. After all, “The First Amendment ensures that all points 
of view may be heard; it does not ensure that all points of view are 
equally likely to prevail.”137 
4. The Second Circuit 
New York City voters, too, may enact new legislation by popular 
ballot initiative.138 New Yorkers mobilized that power to impose a two-
term limit on several of the City’s public officials.139 In 2008, then-
Mayor Michael Bloomberg signed into effect an amendment to increase 
the term limit to three.140 In Molinari v. Bloomberg, Molinari argued 
that the 2008 amendment violated the First Amendment because if City 
Council can amend legislation enacted by popular ballot initiative, then 
“voters in the City will be less likely to participate” in the initiative 
process.141 Molinary posited that lower voter participation in the ballot 
initiative process amounts to less speech, therefore the Council’s ability 
to amend the result of a popular initiative violated the First Amendment. 
That syllogism was fatally flawed, according to the Second Circuit. 
The court endorsed the rationale adopted by the Tenth Circuit in 
Initiative & Referendum Institution. v. Walker; Molinary argued for the 
 
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6, 7, the veto override clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, and the treaty clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Those provisions make impeaching the president, overriding his veto, or 
consenting to his treaty harder to accomplish than, say, passing a bill through congress, which requires 
only a simple majority, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, but they are not subject to First Amendment 
challenges on that account. 
 133. See Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 279 (1st Cir. 2005). . 
 134. Initiative & Referendum Inst., 450 F.3d at 1102 (en banc). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (“[T]he problem with protecting the impact on speech, instead of simply protecting 
speech, is that no one has a right under the First Amendment to be taken seriously.”). 
 137. Id. at 1101. 
 138. Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 591 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 595. 
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right to be listened to, but the First Amendment ensures only his right to 
speak.142 New York City voters may be less likely to participate in 
popular ballot initiatives, making those initiatives less likely to become 
law. All true, the court agreed, but allowing the City Council to amend a 
law enacted by popular initiative does not restrict anyone’s ability to 
speak.143 Molinari, after all, operated under “a state-created right not 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.”144 The amendment, then, did not 
implicate the First Amendment.145 Accordingly, the court expressly 
rejected Molinary’s effort to apply the Anderson-Burdick balancing 
framework because the challenge did not implicate any associational 
right or restrict ballot access.146 
5. The Seventh Circuit 
In Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, a mayoral candidate attempted 
to time-out his political adversary from the ballot by imposing a term 
limit that she had already surpassed.147 To pursue his strategy, Jones 
resorted to the Illinois popular ballot referendum machinery.148 But the 
State’s “Rule of Three”, which “limits to three the number of referenda 
on any ballot,” thwarted Jones, as the maximum number of proposals 
were ahead of his in line.149 Jones argued the Rule of Three prevented 
him from seeking support for his term-limit proposal in violation of the 
First Amendment.150 
The Seventh Circuit rejected Jones’ claim by reviewing the Rule for a 
rational basis.151 The court’s analysis explained that ballots are 
nonpublic forums and citizens have no constitutional right place an issue 
on the ballot.152 It noted, The Supreme Court has confirmed that ballots 
are not “forums for political expression.”153 The court continued, Meyer 
v. Grant held “a state that does open the ballot cannot impose 
unconstitutional conditions,” but the First Amendment by no means 
guarantees the right to bring initiatives to the voting ballot.154 That 
 
 142. Id. at 599-600. 
 143. Id. at 601. 
 144. Id. at 597. 
 145. Id. at 601. 
 146. Id. at 605. 
 147. 892 F.3d 935, 936 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J.). 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 938. 
 152. Id. at 937. 
 153. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 363 (1997). 
 154. Jones, 892 F.3d 937-38. 
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brought the court to the applicable standard: “Because the Rule of Three 
does not distinguish by viewpoint or content,” a rational basis is 
sufficient to sustain it.155 The Rule was rationally related to the 
legitimate State interests in, for example, engendering civic engagement 
by ensuring the ballot does not get bogged down in the complexities of 
too many issues.156 While three proposals at most is not a “magical” 
limit, “the benefit of some limit is plain,” and therefore sufficient.157 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Constitution decentralizes governmental power horizontally 
across three federal branches, as well as vertically, between one national 
government and fifty sovereign States’. The Tenth Amendment, 
moreover, crystalizes the division of power between federal and State 
governments by “reserv[ing] to the Sates respectively,” “[t]he powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution.”158 And the 
Elections Clause of Article I specifically gives States initial control over 
the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections.”159 As a corollary, 
States have the power––indeed the constitutional command––to regulate 
and structure their own federal elections.160  
States have no constitutional obligation to open their election ballots 
to citizen-led ballot initiatives. Put differently, the Constitution 
guarantees no citizen a right to place an initiative on the ballot.161 Still, 
many States embrace direct democracy by providing an avenue to 
promulgate law by popular vote. If a State does provide a ballot 
initiative process, either by constitutional provision or statute, those 
laws that regulate mechanics of the ballot initiative process must comply 
with the Constitution. In particular, those laws must not abridge the 
freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment, as made 
applicable to States through the Fourteenth Amendment.162 
Some State ballot initiative laws have directly restricted political 
expression––like the Colorado laws struck down in Meyer v. Grant and 
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation. Others, 
meanwhile, regulate the process by which popular initiatives reach the 
 
 155. Id. at 938. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 158. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
 159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.   
 160. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992). 
 161. Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, 892 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J.) 
(collecting cases). 
 162. See Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 597 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88, 9 (1940)). 
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ballot. Part III explains why First Amendment challenges to laws that 
regulate “‘the mechanics of the electoral process,’ not speech,” in a 
viewpoint-neutral manner should be subject at most to rational-basis 
review.163 Both practical and principled reasons counsel testing 
challenges of this kind for a rational basis. First, a few distinctions 
warrant clarification. 
A. Meaningful Distinctions 
1. Tiers of Scrutiny164 
Courts have devised three so-called tiers of review to adjudicate 
constitutional challenges: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict 
scrutiny.165 The tiers of constitutional scrutiny grew from the Supreme 
Court’s Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence; soon after, a Justice 
Frankfurter concurring opinion lobbied the Court to demand a more 
compelling state interest for a citizen to “forego . . . his political 
autonomy.”166 Beginning in the next Term, the Court resorted to the tiers 
of scrutiny in First Amendment challenges as a matter of course.167 
A law reviewed for a rational basis is almost certain to be upheld, as it 
must only rationally relate to a legitimate government interest. 
Conversely, a law subject to strict scrutiny, the most exacting standard, 
seldom withstands a constitutional challenge.168 Somewhere in the 
middle lies intermediate scrutiny. In applying intermediate scrutiny, 
courts determine whether the challenged law is substantially related to a 
sufficiently important government interest. 
The tier of constitutional scrutiny applied to a challenged law often 
determines its fate. In the election law area, legitimate state interests are 
 
 163. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 207-08 (1999) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995)). 
 164. Though it exceeds the scope of this Comment, a rich debate persists in the academy over the 
propriety and wisdom of the Supreme Court’s use of tiers of constitutional scrutiny. See Joel Alicea & 
John D. Ohlendorf, Against the Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny, NAT’L AFF., no. 41, Fall 2019, at 72. 
 165. Mariam Morshedi, Levels of Scrutiny, SUBSCRIPT LAW (Mar. 6, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/PLC4-SH9D. 
 166. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (whether 
the New Hampshire Attorney General transgressed a citizen’s First Amendment rights by compelling 
his response to questions); See also Note, Let the End Be Legitimate: Questioning the Value of 
Heightened Scrutiny’s Compelling- and Important-Interest Inquiries, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1406, 1408 
(2016). 
 167. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (“The State clearly has no such compelling 
interest at stake as to justify a short-cut procedure which must inevitably result in suppressing protected 
speech.”). Speiser struck down the denial of a veterans’ tax exemption for refusal to subscribe to pro-
government oaths. See also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  
 168. See Hon. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial 
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1394 n.40 (1995). 
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several—not least of which is the “interest in the orderly administration 
of elections,” which, “preserv[es] the integrity of the election process, 
maintain[s] a stable political system, prevent[s] voter fraud, protect[s] 
public confidence, and reduc[es] administrative costs.”169 But 
intermediate scrutiny demands more than a legitimate interest; it 
requires courts to balance constitutional burdens against those interests. 
In so doing, courts look beyond a mere relation between interest and 
regulation and determine which interest tips the scale: the government’s 
or the citizen’s. It therefore requires courts to inject their own subjective 
measure of importance into the inquiry. Similarly, the Anderson-Burdick 
framework has been labeled “a quintessential balancing test.”170 In 
applying intermediate scrutiny or Anderson-Burdick, a judge may strike 
down a law even if it serves legitimate election regulation interests. 
Accordingly, intermediate scrutiny of State election laws invites 
freewheeling judicial discretion “[i]n sensitive policy-oriented cases.”171 
In addition to often being outcome determinative, the tier of review 
courts apply fundamentally alters their analytic task: Rational-basis 
inquiries ask an objective, binary question about rational relation, 
whereas intermediate scrutiny weighs countervailing interests on a 
sliding, manipulable scale. 
Bearing that in mind, the circuit conflict around the appropriate level 
of scrutiny to apply to First Amendment challenges to State ballot 
initiative laws creates disparate analyses of like challenges across 
jurisdictions. Such disparities are disfavored;172 indeed, as Chief Justice 
Roberts intimated, “the Court is reasonably likely to grant certiorari to 
resolve the split.”173 If the Court does grant certiorari, State sovereignty 
counsels applying rational-basis review to allow States to administer 
orderly elections unencumbered by federal courts’ balancing of 
interests. 
2. Pinpointing the Circuit Conflict: Severity of the Burden 
The Supreme Court has provided some clarity to ballot initiative 
 
 169. Mays v. LaRose, 951 F.3d 775, 784 (6th Cir.2020).  
 170. Daunt v. Benson, 956 F.3d 396, 424 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
 171. Id.; Compare Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983) (“[T]he burdens Ohio has 
placed on the voters' freedom of choice and freedom of association, . . . unquestionably outweigh the 
State's minimal interest in imposing a March deadline.”), with Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 441-42 
(1992) (“We think that Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting, . . . does not impose an unconstitutional 
burden upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the State's voters.”). 
 172. See SUP. CT. R. 10(a). 
 173. Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616, 2616 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the grant 
of stay). 
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regulations such that the window for the circuit courts to diverge within 
is narrow. State regulations that directly restrain the total quantum of 
core political speech, for example, are subject to strict scrutiny under 
Supreme Court precedent.174 The same is true of laws that severely 
burden speech, even if only incidentally. It stands to reason, then, 
“lesser burdens trigger less exacting review.”175 While Meyer v. Grant 
makes certain that regulations on ballot initiative advocacy warrant strict 
scrutiny, such regulations are distinct from “laws that determine the 
process by which [citizen-led] legislation is enacted.”176 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court has been reluctant to “identify any litmus test for 
measuring the severity of a burden that a state law imposes . . . .”177 
The circuit conflict centers around laws that regulate the mechanics of 
the ballot initiative process, and do not incidentally impose a severe on 
speech. While “no bright line” separates “severe from lesser burdens,”178 
the circuit conflict does not hinge on that blurred line. The conflict 
arises after the court has determined that First Amendment burdens are 
not severe. Alas, when state ballot initiative laws regulate procedure but 
nevertheless impose an incidental, yet non-severe, burden on speech, the 
question of what standard of First-Amendment review courts should 
apply remains open. Therein lies the conflict: whether to apply rational-
basis review or balance interests. 
B. Why the Circuit Split? 
A majority of the circuits have weighed in on the circuit conflict. 
Among them, most circuits apply rational-basis review to challenges to 
content-neutral ballot initiative provisions. That lax level of review 
makes sense for laws that regulate election mechanics. Speech is not 
directly silenced when a content-neutral regulation disqualifies an 
initiative from the ballot; those laws enable a State’s fair and organized 
administration of elections, as prescribed by the Elections Clause. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court endorsed that position in Anderson: 
“the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to 
justify’ the restrictions.”179 Yet other circuits disagree; instead they meet 
the same First Amendment challenges with intermediate scrutiny. Those 
 
 174. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (“We fully agree with the Court of Appeals' 
conclusion that this case involves a limitation on political expression subject to exacting scrutiny.”); See 
also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 192 (1999). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1100 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 177. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 178. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 179. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983). 
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jurisdictions are more sensitive to incidental restrictions that ballot 
initiative provisions may impose on political speech.  
Some circuit court decisions cannot be reconciled. The First Circuit in 
Wirzburger and the en banc Tenth Circuit in Initiative & Referendum 
Institution v. Walker both reviewed state constitutional provisions that 
made laws related to a given subject matter harder (Tenth Circuit) or 
impossible (First Circuit) to pass by popular ballot initiative. The 
difference was one in degree only; both lawsuits “raise[d] the same First 
Amendment issue.”180 Where the First Circuit applied the intermediate 
scrutiny standard of O’Brien, the Tenth Circuit expressly rejected that 
approach.181 The First Circuit determined the Massachusetts provisions 
“eliminate a valuable avenue of expression about those subjects,” 
thereby placing an incidental restriction on speech.182 The Tenth Circuit 
said, “O'Brien applies [only] to laws that restrict expressive conduct, . . . 
not statutes that ma[ke] the expression less persuasive or less likely to 
produce results.”183 The court believed the provisions only had an 
incidental impact on the effect of speech, which is unprotected since no 
one has the right to legislate.184 
The disparate approaches cannot be squared. The Tenth Circuit was 
more persuasive; it explained how the First Circuit relied on Meyer v 
Grant but stretched it beyond its context.185 The regulation in Meyer 
unconstitutionally abridged core political speech because it limited the 
number of people––namely, circulators––who could convey a message. 
That is a far cry from “reducing speech because it makes particular 
speech less likely to succeed.”186 “There is no First Amendment right to 
place an initiative on the ballot.”187 Neither the Massachusetts nor Utah 
constitutional provisions burdened ballot-initiative advocacy, only 
process. Thus, a rational relation to the State’s election maintenance 
interest should suffice. 
The D.C. Circuit case, Marijuana Policy Project, illustrates the 
distinction. Recall that an amendment to the D.C. Home Rule Act made 
Congress, not the D.C. Council, the suitable legislative body to enact 
laws related to reducing the penalty for marijuana use.188 A heightened-
 
 180. Initiative & Referendum Inst., 450 F.3d at 1102. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 277 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 183. Initiative & Referendum Inst., 450 F.3d at 1102. 
 184. Marijuana Policy Project v. United States, 304 F.3d 82, 85 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“[A]lthough the 
First Amendment protects public debate about legislation, it confers no right to legislate on a particular 
subject.”). 
 185. Initiative & Referendum Inst., 450 F.3d at 1100. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 188. Marijuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 83. 
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scrutiny jurisdiction would conclude that the amendment sets legislative 
boundaries consistent with the legitimate interests and measure that 
interest against the incidental burdens on expression it produces. The 
argument advanced by the plaintiff goes: to remove a topic from the 
ambit of ballot initiative process is to quell speech on the topic. Not true. 
It merely removes one avenue to enact legislation. While “the First 
Amendment protects public debate about legislation, it confers no right 
to legislate on a particular subject.”189 The Supreme Court has said, 
“[T]he function of the election process is ‘to winnow out and finally 
reject all but the chosen candidates.’”190 So too for ballot initiatives.191 
As such, “[a]ttributing to elections a more generalized expressive 
function would undermine the ability of States to operate elections fairly 
and efficiently.”192 Judge Easterbrook stated the point eloquently: “the 
ballot is [not] a public forum.”193 
When state laws disqualify certain subject matters from the popular 
initiative process, proponents of that initiative remain free to lobby their 
representative lawmakers. But the First Amendment secures no right in 
popular ballot initiative voters to initiate specific laws.194 Therefore, 
when a state or municipality excludes a subject––take as examples, 
religious funding in Massachusetts and marijuana penalties in 
Washington––from the ballot initiative process, that statute or 
constitutional provision should only need to pass rational-basis review. 
A Sovereign State, after all, is owed “appropriate deference to the policy 
decisions,” it makes geared toward “structuring its government, 
including how it seeks to administer elections.”195 Any more exacting 
scrutiny would turn to reality the Supreme Court’s admonishment 
against undermining State election operations by misattributing to 
election processes a generalized expressive function.196 
Courts should not apply the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework 
to these laws, either. Anderson-Burdick balancing applies to free 
association challenges of election laws. A state law that regulates ballot 
initiative mechanics does not impede a voter’s ability to associate with 
any candidate or initiative. The Sixth Circuit applied Anderson-Burdick 
 
 189. Id. at 85. 
 190. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 
(1974)). 
 191. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 426 (1988) (recognizing the state interest in “protecting the 
integrity of the initiative process”). 
 192. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438. 
 193. Jones, 892 F.3d at 937. 
 194. See Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1102 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc). 
 195. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 426 (Readler, J., concurring) (citing Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election 
Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) and Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506-07 (2019)). 
 196. See Marijuana Policy Project, 304 F.3d at 85.  
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in Schmitt v. LaRose; it said, “we generally evaluate First Amendment 
challenges to state election regulations under the three-step Anderson-
Burdick framework.”197 But that framework is not generally applicable. 
It applies to election laws that inhibit free association, such as Ohio’s 
former early filing deadline for candidates.198 Indeed, extending 
Anderson-Burdick beyond its boundaries has vaulted courts into 
exercises of “legal gymnastics.”199 
And, even if a content-neutral law “reduc[es] the total quantum of 
speech” in effect by disqualifying certain initiatives, thereby 
disincentivizing advocacy for that initiative,200 it does not hinder one’s 
ability to associate with the idea that petition supports. That is, a 
disincentive to advocate for a cause because it is not up for 
consideration on the ballot is not a restriction on advocacy or 
association in a First Amendment sense. Such a law does not inhibit 
one’s ability, as guaranteed by the First Amendment, to associate with 
the idea embodied in a failed initiative. The Constitution does not 
include a “right to use the ballot box as a forum for advocating a 
policy.”201 The Anderson-Burdick framework, then, misfits the task of 
judicial review of content-neutral State ballot initiative regulations.202 
The Second Circuit explained why the Anderson-Burdick framework 
is inapplicable to regulations of process. There must be “at least some 
burden on the voter-plaintiffs' [associational] rights.”203 State election-
mechanics laws burden no associational right. New York’s law, for 
example, allowed its City Council to amend a law enacted by popular 
ballot initiative; that law may thwart ballot initiative popularity, but it 
does not affect the right to speak or associate with an idea. Anderson-
Burdick’s balancing framework imparts interest balacing when a State 
law burdens the right to associate. Rational-basis review is more 
appropriate for ballot initiative regulations that indiscriminately preserve 
orderly and fair elections. 
Neither Meyer v. Grant nor Anderson and Burdick provide a rationale 
that applies to content neutral restrictions on ballot initiative 
processes.204 Given states’ weighty interest in administering orderly 
 
 197. Schmitt v. LaRose, 933 F.3d 628, 639 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 198. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782 (1983). 
 199. Mays, 951 F.3d at 783 n.4 (6th Cir. 2020) (Nalbandian, J.). 
 200. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 423. 
 201. Jones, 892 F.3d at 937 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J.) (quoting Georges v. Carney, 691 
F.2d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 202. See Daunt, 956 F.3d at 425 (Readler, J., concurring) (“I am thus understandably reluctant to 
apply Anderson-Burdick even in resolving election disputes”). 
 203. Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 604 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 204. In Crawford v. Marion County. Election Board, Justice Scalia argued that Burdick controls 
laws respecting the right to vote, including those governing “voting process.” 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) 
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elections, interest balancing should be off limits to laws that neither 
target core political speech nor severely burden speech as an incident to 
another election interest. 
C. Federal Courts Should Not Balance State Election Interests 
The Constitution strikes a delicate balance between national and State 
authority.205 “[I]t is characteristic of our federal system that States retain 
autonomy to establish their own governmental processes.”206 Several 
States maintain directly democratic systems that allow their voters to 
enact laws by popular ballot initiative. Popular initiative mechanisms 
“are not compelled by the Federal Constitution. It is instead up to the 
people of each State, acting in their sovereign capacity, to decide 
whether and how to permit legislation by popular action.”207 States must 
administer their elections in an equitable and efficient manner. That 
prerogative applies no less to popular ballot initiative processes.  
Respect for the separation of powers counsels against the federal 
judiciary balancing whether a State’s interest in election administration 
serves a sufficiently substantial governmental interest to justify 
incidental burdens on the First Amendment.208 As Justice Scalia 
exclaimed, “[t]hat sort of detailed judicial supervision of the election 
process would flout the Constitution's express commitment of the task to 
the States.”209 
The reason “state judgments are best made by the States, not 
unelected federal judges,” is deeply rooted in tradition and constitutional 
structure.210 America’s Founders fiddled with and ultimately discarded 
the idea of direct democracy. For, they feared the tyranny of the 
majority.211 “Pure democrac[ies],” James Madison explained, are 
conducive to “the mischiefs of faction”; they invite “spectacles of 
 
(plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). But Justice Scalia was advancing a “two-track 
approach” that is slightly different from what has come to be known as “Anderson-Burdick balancing.” 
Id. In fact, Justice Scalia’s concurrence disavowed “detailed judicial supervision of the election 
process.” Id. at 208. In any event, Burdick does not control laws governing the mechanics of ballot 
initiatives. 
 205. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amend X.   
 206. Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015); 
Solimine, supra note 2, at 679. 
 207. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 212 (2010) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 208. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1103 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(“We can imagine few tasks less appropriate to federal courts than deciding which state constitutional 
limitations serve "important governmental interests" and which do not.”). 
 209. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citing the Elections Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1). 
 210. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 430 (Readler, J., concurring). 
 211. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
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turbulence and contention,” and are “incompatible with personal 
security or the rights of property.”212 Those defects were antithetical to 
the anti-majoritarian system of government the Framers had devised in 
the summer of 1787. But nor did the Framers outlaw directly democratic 
forms of governance, so long as they were commensurate with the 
“guarantee” of “a Republican Form of Government.”213 Rather, the 
Constitution simply did not speak to citizen-led popular ballot 
initiatives. 
The structure of the Constitution established “the dual-sovereign 
system” as a “foundational” precept of  “our Republic.”214 And the 
Tenth Amendment enshrined the principle that the “the several States” 
retain “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over” the powers not 
elsewhere enumerated in the Constitution.215 Because the Constitution 
neither enumerated nor forbade it, “the right to propose initiatives is an 
exclusively state-created right that the First Amendment does not 
guarantee.”216 While, as always, “the Constitution provides a 
backstop,”217 tradition counsels according “deference to the policy 
decisions of a sovereign state in structuring its government, including 
how it seeks to administer elections.”218 Under the limited form of 
government the Framers constituted—properly deferential to States’ 
sovereignty where an enumerated right is not severely burdened—“[i]t 
is for state legislatures to weigh the costs and benefits of” provisions “to 
their election codes, and their judgment must prevail unless it imposes a 
severe and unjustified overall burden.”219 In other words, given a 
rational law free from severe First-Amendment burdens, the federal 
judiciary usurps its role by purporting to balance State election interests.  
Such a course necessarily imposes the unrestrained “exercise of judicial 
will,” where instead the States are due deference.220 
It is one thing to determine a law rationally relates to a legitimate 
State interest. It is quite different to determine whether that interest is 
 
 212. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 213. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (Guarantee Clause).   
 214. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 428 (Readler, J., concurring) (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 
918 (1997)). 
 215. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
 216. Jones, 892 F.3d at 937-38 (7th Cir. 2018) (Easterbrook, J.). 
 217. Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 813 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). 
 218. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 426 (Readler, J., concurring) (citing Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election 
Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 181 (2008) (plurality opinion); See also id. at 427 (“or whether the state practice 
hews more closely to traditional election mechanics, . . . we owe deference to the strong state interests at 
play, absent a clear constitutional command to the contrary”). 
 219. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 208 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). 
 220. June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2136 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring in judgment) (quoting New Jersey v. T. L. O., 469 U. S. 325, 369 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
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weightier than the incidental burden it imposes on the First Amendment. 
Certainly, Article III judges are imminently qualified to discern the 
degree to which a regulation burdens free speech or expression.221 
Holding that constant, it is only half the judge’s task when intermediate 
scrutiny is the standard of review—the judge must still balance State 
interests against that burden. On what basis might a judge adequately 
evaluate the magnitude of importance of a State’s election 
administration interest? Justice Scalia likened such a task to attempting 
to “judg[e] whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is 
heavy.”222 “Pretending” to “objectively assign weight to such 
imponderable values” as a State’s constitutionally conferred election 
interests, Chief Justice Roberts remarked, “would require [federal 
judges] to act as legislators.”223 
There can be no doubt that thoughtful minds would differ: one judge 
(or panel) may side with the State interests, the next judge—from 
another jurisdiction—may just as well go the other way. That is so 
because “Anderson-Burdick leaves much to a judge’s subjective 
determination.”224 As do all balancing tests that “rel[y] on a sliding scale 
to weigh the burden a law imposes against the corresponding state 
interests in imposing the law.”225 Such “judicial flexibility in picking 
winners and losers in sensitive disputes rarely furthers the interests of 
justice,” and often invites “arbitrary results.”226 
Elected State officials, by contrast to federal judges, have intimate 
knowledge of State interests and are validated by and accountable to the 
electorate; they are better equipped to decide such policy considerations. 
When the law under review does not severely burden the First 
Amendment, federal courts should yield to State legislatures by applying 
rational-basis review. Yes, jettisoning balancing tests would sacrifice 
judicial “flexibility.”227 But where flexibility is absent, predictability, 
judicial restraint, and neutrality emerge—each attribute promotes 
legitimacy and allows States to govern under ascertainable, intelligible 
legal standards.228 For the jurisdictions that have been led astray by 
 
 221. Indeed, courts are left to determine whether the reviewed law severely burdens speech, and if 
so, strict scrutiny is the applicable standard of review. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 427 
(1988). 
 222. June Medical Services, 140 S. Ct. at 2136 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in judgment) 
(quoting Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U. S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment)). 
 223. Id. (balancing State health regulation against Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest). 
 224. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 424 (Readler, J., concurring). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 425 (citation omitted). 
 227. Ohio Democratic Party v. Husted, 834 F.3d 620, 627 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 228. Daunt, 956 F.3d at 424-25 (Readler, J., concurring). 
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balancing tests, rational-basis review would restore objectivity and 
uniformity to judicial review of State ballot initiative regulations. 
 Take Utah’s requirement that popular initiative laws related to 
wildlife management require a supermajority’s support to illustrate the 
point. The State legislature amended the Utah Constitution in 1998 after 
the people of Utah voted in favor of the proposition imposing a 
supermajority requirement.229 Utah’s supermajority requirement aimed 
to prevent east coast special interest groups from controlling Utah’s 
wildlife management.230 The people substantiated that interest. What 
qualifies unaccountable judges to reevaluate that product of democracy? 
The same could be said of Nevada’s All Districts Rule. Even though the 
Ninth Circuit concluded that Nevada’s interests outweighed the alleged 
burden on expression, that policy determination was not properly left to 
a federal court. The Nevada Constitution already so determined.231 
In Buckley, Justice O’Connor—a champion of federalism—inferred 
from Burdick that a regulation that “impos[es] only indirect and less 
substantial burdens on communication” “should be subject to review for 
reasonableness.”232 Indeed, Burdick says, “[t]he State has a legitimate 
interest in preventing these sorts of maneuvers, and the write-in voting 
ban is a reasonable way of accomplishing this goal.”233 A “reasonable 
way” of preventing a “legitimate interest” closely resembles the 
rational-relation requirement of rational-basis review. Justice 
O’Connor’s formulation asks first whether the regulation in question 
targets communication or election mechanics. If communication is the 
target, then strict scrutiny applies under Meyer v. Grant. If the law 
regulates election mechanics, determine next whether it imposes a 
severe burden on speech. If not severe, a reasonable law will survive 
First Amendment review.234 
 
 229. Initiative & Referendum Inst., 450 F.3d at 1086. 
 230. Id. 
 231. See NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2. 
 232. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182,216 (1999) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice O’Connor’s quote bears providing in 
full: 
Under the Burdick approach, the threshold inquiry is whether Colorado's 
regulations directly and substantially burden the one-on-one, communicative 
aspect of petition circulation or whether they primarily target the electoral 
process, imposing only indirect and less substantial burdens on communication. If 
the former, the regulation should be subject to strict scrutiny. If the latter, the 
regulation should be subject to review for reasonableness. 
Id. Notwithstanding the intermediate scrutiny test that bears Burdick’s name, the Burdick 
Court arguably subjected Hawaii’s write-in provisions to a less exacting standard of review 
that more resembles rational basis.  
 233. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 440 (1992).  
 234. See also Mays, 951 F.3d at 782 (6th Cir. 2020) (Nalbandian, J.) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (“When States impose reasonable nondiscriminatory restrictions on the right to vote, courts 
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That formulation respects State election prerogatives, bearing in 
mind, “a State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to 
justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”235 Judges are 
uniquely qualified to determine whether a law is reasonable; they are not 
so qualified, however, to qualify the importance of State election 
interests. 
When judges review a First Amendment challenge for a rational 
relation to a State interest, they perform their essential role. But when a 
judge balances interests, as is often––but not here––necessary, they 
undermine State sovereignty. Courts superimpose their own subjective 
judgment of the importance of a State interest where the court owed the 
State deference. Interest balancing of content neutral State ballot 
initiative laws defies principles of federalism by allowing courts to 
second guess the work of State officials. The separation of powers, 
undergirded by the Elections Clause, demands otherwise. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
First principles embedded in the structure of the Constitution and 
judicial restraint should resolve the circuit conflict centered on the 
appropriate standard of review for First Amendment challenges to 
content-neutral State ballot initiative regulations. The Supreme Court 
flagged the issue in Little v. Reclaim Idaho, but has not issued binding 
precedent.236 The District of Columbia, Second, Seventh, Eighth, and 
Tenth Circuits properly apply rational-basis review to gatekeeping laws 
that do not severely burden speech. The First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, 
however, aggrandize the judicial role by balancing State interests against 
First Amendment burdens, even when those burdens are not severe. 
State election regulations of process demand deference of the federal 
judiciary. Intermediate scrutiny—where courts balance state election 
interests against constitutional burdens—tramples on State sovereignty. 
A three-part test would optimally resolve the circuit conflict. 
A State regulation of its ballot initiative process is constitutional if it: 
(1) targets “the mechanics of the electoral process, not speech;”237 (2) 
does not impose a severe burden on the First Amendment;238 and (3) 
 
apply rational basis review.”).  
 235. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 206 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 236. Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616 (2020). 
 237. Id. at 207-08 (Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); See 
Molinari v. Bloomberg, 564 F.3d 587, 597 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 9 
(1940)). 
 238. See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 216 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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reasonably relates to a legitimate election interest.239 
That test, derived from Justice O’Connor’s partial concurrence in 
Buckley, adheres to Supreme Court precedent by asking two threshold 
questions—familiar questions of intent and impact. Finally, the 
reasonableness prong elevates State sovereignty by imparting an 
objective standard akin to rational-basis review. 
 
 
 239. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 440. 
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